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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON 
PIPE COMPANY, a corporation 
Plaintiff 
-vs.-
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
D.efendant 
Case No. 9493 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
A. 
Defendant continued to insinuate during the hearing 
and now continues in its brief to assert that the interstate 
transactions here involved should be taxable in some way 
because none of the customers in hauling the pipe to the 
out-of-state job site had a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity from the Utah State Public Service 
Commission. Of such straw is the defendant's case made. 
In the first place, defendant is concerned with en-
forcing the state tax laws and those pertaining to the 
regulation of public motor carriers are outside its purview. 
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In the second place, cases cited by plaintiff clearly 
establish that interstate commerce is "a practical con-
ception not drawn from the 'witty diversities' (Y elv., 33) 
of the law of Sales", and the place where title passes has 
nothing to do with whether a sale is interstate commerce. 
In the third pJace, even if the interstate hauls here 
involved were subject to motor carrier regulation, the 
Federal Interstate Comri:ierce Commission would be pri-
marily involved, not the Utah State Public Service Com-
mission. 
In the fourth place, it is apparent that defendant's 
loose insinuations are made without inquiry into the law 
because it is quite clear that the interstate transportation 
here involved being incidental to and in furtherance of 
the primary construction business of the contractor-cus-
tomers of plaintiff, constitutes private carriage under the 
law and whether or not the contractor happens to make 
a profit from the transportation activity and whether or 
not title passes to the contractor f.o.b. point of delivery or 
point of destination. 
For example, Williams Bros. Corp. Cont. Car. App._. 
44 Motor Carrier Cases (ICC 55 7 ( Div. 5) ( 1945) , held 
that a general contractor whose business was the con-
struction of pipe lines was not a common or contract 
carrier but a private carrier when in connection with its 
business of laying' pl.pe lines, it hauled pipe from railhead, 
boat point, storage yard or elsewhere at a profit to the 
jdb site and strung the pipe along trench site for welding 
and laying in the ground . 
. The above ·case involved the definition ·of the term 
"private carrier of property by motor vehicle" in Sec. 203 
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(a) ( 17) of the Interstate Commerce Act. A private 
carrier was there defined as a person, other than a con-
tract or common carrier, "which transports in interstate 
or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of which 
such person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such 
transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or 
bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise." 
See also: Brooks Transp. Co., Inc. v. United States, 
93 Fed. Sup. 517 (1950) (E. D. Va.), affirmed 340 U.S. 
925, (also affirming Lenoir Chair Co. Cont. Car. App., 
51 MCC 65). 
The opinion (per Dobie, J.) States: 
"The Commission, in deciding that Lenoir and 
Schenley were private carriers, as opposed to con-
tract carriers or common carriers, applied what is 
known as the primary business test. In other words, 
if it is established that the primary business of a con-
cern is the manufacture or sale of goods which the 
owner transports in furtherance of that business and 
the transportation is merely incidental thereto, the 
carriage of such goods from the factory or other 
place of business to the customer is private carriage 
even though a charge for transportation is included 
in the selling price or is added thereto as a separate 
item." 
****** 
"The history of the Act, we think, completely de-
molishes the validity of plaintiff's compensation cri-
terion and supports the Commission's criterion of 
Primary business purpose." 
The fact that none of plaintiff's customers "had a 
license from the Public Service Commission of Utah" is 
completely irrelevant to the present case. 
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B. 
All of the sworn testimony and all of the contractual 
documents, show conclusively that all pipe was purchased 
at prices delivered to the out-of-state job siteand for use 
on the specific out-of-state job in accordance with the 
engineer's plans and specifications. All of the documents, 
including the bills of lading, show beyond any possibility 
, of doubt that an interstate shipment of goods was re-
quired in the performance of the contracts of sale. 
In the face of this clear and undisputable evidence, 
what is defendant's contention? 
"It is contended that these documents were 
a sham, not legally binding on the parties, and in-
tended to convert wholly intrastate sales into- sales 
purporting to be in interstate commerce." (Page 5 
of Brief) 
Again, of such straw is defendant's case made. 
There is, of course, in the record not even the slight-
est scintilla of evidence to warrant the above accusation 
that plaintiff is using faise, fraudulent or counterfeit doc-
uments for the purpose of converting intrastate taxable 
sales into non-taxable sales in interstate commerce. The 
accusation is pure nonsense. 
The documents are apparently not sham \vhen the 
pipe goes under the contract and bill of lading by com-
mon carrier to the out-of-state job site. They are only 
sham when the pipe goes under the same contract and bill 
of lading by customer truck to the out-of-state job site. 
Indeed, how can this nonsensical accusation itself be re-
conciled with the following statement on page 3 of de-
fendant's brief? 
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"All of the sales herein were solicited by means 
of quotations issued by petitioner to contractors bid-
ding on various out-of-state jobs, and the materials 
so sold were purchased for use on specific out-of-state 
jobs and were of specified sizes and lengths to con-
form to the specifications covering the particular 
out-of-state job." 
c. 
Defendant state in its brief (pages 3 and 4) that the 
Tax Commission has "found" ( 1) that there existed no 
contractual obligation to deliver the material sold across 
state lines, (2) that notwithstanding the bills of lading 
signed by the purchaser upon receiving the materials, 
delivery was made at plaintiff's plant at Ironton, and ( 3) 
that plaintiff's responsibility to effect delivery of the 
materials to the out-of-state job site ceased when the 
purchaser took possession of the materials at Ironton. 
We respectfully suggest defendant must be talking 
about some other case. These are certainly not the facts 
of this case. The findings have no support whatsoever in 
the record. 
The unequivocal sworn testimony of every witness, 
the clear and undisputable import of every contractual 
document, show beyond doubt that the sales were inter-
state sales of cast iron pipe into out-of-state sewage or 
waterworks engineering projects. The sales were nego-
tiated by plaintiff's out-of-state sales agents at delivered 
prices, including freight, to a specific out-of-state job 
site for the specific sizes, lengths and types of material 
specified in the job plans and specifications. Plaintiff 
maintained complete control and responsibility at all 
times over the selection of the means of transport to the 
out-of-state job site whether by its own trucks or by com-
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mon carrier or by customer truck. For credit and collection 
purposes, plaintiff in every instance 'followed the pipe 
right inta- the ground' at the out-of-state job site. In 
every customer truck shipment here involved possession at 
the foundry at Ironton was taken by the purchaser under 
bill of lading for the sole and paid purpose of hauling the 
material to the specific out-of-state destination shown on 
the bill of lading. In every instance the purchaser was 
paid the established interstate tariff rate for the haul by 
means of credits against the delivered invoice prices. In 
no instance was there a breach of contract and the mater-
ial diverted to local intrastate use by the purchaser. 
Cases cited by plaintiff make it abundantly clear that 
interstate commerce is a practical conception in nowise 
concerned with the problem of who bears the risk of loss 
of the goods in transit, i.e. where title passes. If title 
passes to the customer f.o.b. foundry, it does so in all cases, 
including common carrier shipments which defendant 
does not here seek to tax. The so-called 'evasive' testimony 
referred to by defendant relating to risk of loss (page 
4), is merely to the effect that plaintiff in practically all 
cases actually handles or processes the damage claims 
·with the carrier or insurance company through its traffic 
department. 
On whom lies the risk of loss of the goods in transit 
is something which simply has nothing to do with the 
case at bar. 
D. 
Defendant argues the sales tax herein is valid, be-
cause imposed on a 'local activity.' The argument is with-
out any merit. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Utah, the state of the seller, cannot tax the gross 
receipts of interstate sales. This is settled and recognized 
law under the Adams, Gwin-White and Freeman decis-
ions. This is so, a fortiori, where as here most of the sales 
transactions have already been taxed in the states of the 
buyer making the burdensome consequences to interstate 
trade, in the words of the Freeman decision, "unden-
iable." 
After hopefully suggesting some undisclosed distinc-
tion between a gross receipts tax on sales and a sales tax 
on gross receipts, defendant then concedes plaintiff's 
argument (page 12) by stating: 
"Generally, when a sale involves the delivery 
of merchandise to a destination outside the state 
where sold, the validity of a sales tax levied by such 
state on such transaction is denied." (Citing the 
Crew Levick and Adams cases). 
Why, it may be asked, if this is the law 'generally', is 
it now not applicable here? 
Defendant's argument, on analysis, reduces down to 
this: There can be no such thing as interstate commerce 
unless delivery is made "to an interstate carrier for trans-
portation beyond the state." (p. 12). No matter what the 
facts, no matter how clear the certainty of foreign destina-
tion and use, "sales tax may be applied" if physical pos-
session by the out-of-state purchaser is taken within the 
state of the seller. This, of course, is clearly not the law. 
The cases cited by plaintiff amply demonstrate the inter-
state transport may be performed by the purchaser. Each 
case turns on its own facts and if the proof is, as here, that 
possession by the purchaser is taken under the contract 
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and bill of lading for the sole and paid purpose of trans-
port across the state line, there is interstate and not intra-
state commerce. 
The several cases cited by defendant, including par-
ticularly the Wood Preserving, International Harvester, 
Trotwood Trailers, Blind Bull Coal and Superior Oil 
cases, merely hold that a sale is taxable where an out-of~ 
state purchaser comes within the state and purchases 
merchandise under a sales transaction which is completely 
closed and completed by the transfer of title and un-
restricted delivery of possession within the seller's state. 
This is, of course, settled law and it makes no difference 
that the purchaser in his mind may then or thereafter 
intend to transport the merchandise to some other state. 
The point is that the contract of sale does not require for 
its consummation delivery across the state line. The cir-
cumstances show no manifest certainty of foreign or out-
of-state destination. The buyer may change his mind. He 
may decide to use the property locally. He is under no 
obligation to transport the property across the state line 
for use at an out-of-state job site. 
A simple example illustrates this line of authority. 
A visitor from Chicago staying 'at the Hotel Utah may 
cross the street and purchase a hat from the Z.QM.I. 
store. He pays for the hat, takes title and full and unre-
stricted delivery of possession of the hat in Utah. This is 
obviously a local sale. The purchaser has the right to use, 
resell, abandon or give away the hat in Utah. Whether 
or not he has an intention to ultimately wear, carry or ship 
the hat back to Chicago is completely immaterial. It is, 
of course, obvious that this type of case bears no resem-
blance whatsoever to the case at bar. 
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We cannot distinguish the cases cited by defendant 
as well as did the Supreme Court in its opinion in the 
Richfield Oil case ( 329 U.S. at p. 82) : 
"The fact that delivery to a common carrier 
for export gave the sale immunity inS palding & Bros. 
v. Edwards, supra, is seized upon as stating a rule 
that the process of exportation has not started until 
such delivery has been made. And cases like Super-
ior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, are relied 
upon as indicating that delivery to the purchaser 
is not sufficient. That case arose under the Com-
merce Clause. Mississippi was upheld in its effort 
to tax a distributor or wholesaler who purchased 
gasoline and later took it to Louisiana for sale. The 
Court said, p. 395, that although the course of bus-
iness indicated the likely destination of the oil, it 
was "in the hands of the purchaser to do with as it 
liked, and there was nothing that in any way com-
mitted it to sending the oil to Louisiana except its 
own wishes." The Court held, therefore, that the 
tax was not on goods moving in interstate commerce. 
But it added, p. 396, "Dramatic circumstances, such 
as a great universal stream of grain from the State of 
purchase to a market elsewhere, may affect the legal 
conclusion by showing the manifest certainty of the 
destination and exhibiting grounds of policy that are 
absent here." 
Thus did the Court again reaffirm its historic test 
of interstate commerce as being the manifest certainty 
of the destination and not shipment by common carrier as 
urged here by defendant in the case at bar. 
If a consigned sale under bill of lading to a Pueblo, 
Colorado, sewage project at a delivered price with freight 
payable by plaintiff, as seller, does not constitute a mani-
fest certainty of out-of-state destination, what possible 
evidence could make it more certain? 
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E. 
The various cases cited by defendant involving the 
purchase of supplies or equipment for use in conducting 
interstate commerce obviously have no pertinence to the 
case at bar. The pipe is not purchased for use in an inter-
state pipe line. It is purchased for transport and use out-
side the state in out-of-state sewage and waterworks pro-
jects. 
F. 
Defendant's argument about double taxation under 
the due process heading is in the wrong place and mis-
concieves the point of the case at bar. Regardless whether 
double taxation infringes the due process clause, the 
Western Livestock, Adams, Gwin-White and Freeman 
cases, all hold that the risk of multiple taxation on the 
same sales transaction is what constitutes the test of in-
validity of the tax under the commerce clause. Cases 
cited by plaintiff show the Supreme Court has sanctioned 
the imposition of a sales or use tax in the state of the 
buyer. 
We rna y concede, as suggested by defendant ( p. 29), 
that plaintiff "is supposed to know the law." It could 
be asked, how·ever, whether defendant considers itself 
immune from the same requirement. 
Plaintiff's argument under the due process heading 
is simply that a tax on the full proceeds of sale, without 
apportionment, is invalid. 
G. 
Defendant's discussion of credit provisions in certain 
use tax laws of sales taxes paid in other jurisdictions has 
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no pertinence to the constitutional prohibition of a tax 
by the state of the seller on the proceeds of an interstate 
sale. Whether the law of the state of the buyer has such 
a credit provision is immaterial. This is, for example, 
precisely the point decided by this Court in the Whitmore 
Oxygen case denying a credit under the Utah use tax 
law to the buyer in Utah because Indiana, the state of 
the seller, 'was regarded as constitutionally precluded from 
levying a tax on the same sales transaction under the 
Adams case. 
H. 
Again, defendant misconcieves plaintiff's argument 
under the equal protection heading. It may be conceded 
that the legislature might tax sales of certain tangible 
personal property but exempt sales of motor vehicles from 
tax. The discrimination here, however, is not in the 
taxing of certain kinds of personal property but where all 
are taxed basing the exemption of interstate commerce 
simply on the means of transport across the state line. The 
exemption of the sale from tax cannot under the cases be 
made to depend on the type or form of interstate trans-
port. 
I. 
The article in the University of Detroit Law Journal 
by Norman L. Zemke ( 1 ) and Thomas W. Watkins, ( 2) 
republished in defendant's brief appears to be a very in-
teresting discussion of some of the cases which . relate to 
the taxation of interstate commerce. Surely, no one can 
disagree with the following statement in their summation 
(p. 55): 
( 1) LL.B. University of Detroit. Admitted to bar 1957. 
(2) LL.B. University of Detroit. Admitted to bar 1956. 
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"After much discussion about "local activity", 
"cumulative burdens", "direct-indirect burdens", 
etc., it is time to look to the basic principles." 
A reading of this article would show that the authors 
would probably not disagree with the following conclusion 
of another eminent scholar in this field, Thomas Reed 
Powell, who states in New Light On Gross Receipts Taxes, 
53 H.L.R. at p. 928: 
"So far as the actual decisions go, the law of the 
moment says that the state of entrance may tax but 
the state of exit may not." 
Utah, in the case at bar, happens to be the state of 
exit and the Adams, Gwin-White and Freeman cases still 
happen to be the 'law of the moment'. No party to a law 
suit can ask for more than the law of the moment. 
Plaintiff is also indebted to Messrs. Zemke and Wat-
kins for the referenc-e to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line 
Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 ( 1954) for another case 
again reaffirming the princi pie that Texas, as a state of 
exit, cannot under the commerce clause tax the taking 
and purchase of gas transported by the purchaser through 
its own pipe line for use and sale outside Texas. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. M. Gilmour 
Kear~ Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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